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Greater use of renewable energy is seen as a key component of any move to combat climate change,
and is being aggressively promoted as such by the new U.S. administration and by other governments.
Yet there is little economic analysis of renewable energy. This paper surveys what is written and adds
to it. The conclusion is that the main renewables face a major problem because of their intermittency
(the wind doesn’t always blow nor the sun always shine) and that this has not been adequately factored
into discussions of their potential. Without new storage technologies that can overcome this intermittency,
much of the decarbonization of the economy will have to come from nuclear, carbon capture and storage
(CCS) and energy efficiency (geothermal and biofuels can make small contributions). Nuclear and
CCS are not without their problems. New energy storage technologies could greatly increase the role
of renewables, but none are currently in sight.
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Renewable energy is the energy du jour. In his inaugural address President 
Obama promised to “… harness the sun and the winds and the soil to fuel our cars 
and run our factories.” In keeping with this theme, he has allocated substantial 
subsidies to renewables while asserting that the United States will obtain a 
significant portion of its energy from renewables within one or two decades. 
According to the Department of Energy 10% of our electricity should come from 
renewables by 2012 and 25% by 2025,2 aims supported by the Renewable Portfolio 
Standards of 28 states requiring between 15 and 20% of all electricity to be from 
renewables by 2020 to 2030. There is even talk of a Federal RPS, mandating similar 
goals at the national level. For those with an historical bent, there is a real sense of 
déjà vu here: three centuries ago, we used nothing but renewables, with a fully 
sustainable energy system consisting of wind power (windmills), hydro power 
(water mills) and biofuels (wood stoves and animal power). Now we are trying to 
return to the past, with the addition of a few new sources such as solar and 
geothermal. In the interim our population has increased by a factor of ten and 
economic activity by several orders of magnitude.  
One might think that these heroic goals would be based on a detailed analysis 
of the prospects for a rollout of renewable energy, with a comprehensive literature 
on the economics of renewable energy. Sadly this is not the case: there is a 
literature, and there are some notable contributions, but nothing remotely in 
keeping with the emphasis on renewables in policy circles. So this paper is both a 
reflection on the literature we have and a call for a literature that we don’t yet have. 
The first discussion of renewables in economics was in the post-73 oil shock 
era, when we rediscovered Hotelling’s work on resource depletion and refined it in 
various ways. We invented the phrase “backstop technology,” a technology that 
would eventually replace exhaustible resources with an energy source continuing 
forever. Partha Dasgupta and I used the idea in our work extending Hotelling’s 
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analysis (Dasgupta and Heal, 1973), William Nordhaus worked with this idea in his 
book on the efficient allocation of energy resources (Nordhaus 1973), in which he 
tried to work out the competitive price of oil, and so did many others – a quick 
search for “backstop technology” on Google Scholar produced 8,540 references. No 
one modeled the backstop explicitly, but it was clearly not a fossil fuel that we had in 
mind: it could have been nuclear fusion, or solar or wind energy. The only economic 
role it played was in setting an upper limit to the price of fossil energy, an endpoint 
for the price path of an exhaustible resource.  
The need for renewables, in the sense of energy from non-exhaustible 
sources having no environmental footprint, was also recognized and featured in the 
literature on “spaceship earth.” But again there was little discussion of the details of 
these energy sources and their characteristics. Kenneth Boulding’s work on The 
Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth (Boulding 1966) and Ralph D’Arge and 
Kiichiro Kogiku’s paper on Economic Growth and the Environment (D’Arge and 
Kogiku 1973) both pointed to the need for inexhaustible low-impact energy sources, 
generally taken to be nuclear fusion, but did not grapple in any detail with the 
economics of such sources.  
The need to act on climate change, coupled with the realization that there are 
no silver bullets like nuclear fusion, has forced policy makers to grapple with the 
merits of alternative energy and consider the consequences of moving to carbon-
free energy within a few decades. Of course, carbon-free is not the same as 
renewable: nuclear is carbon-free, but probably not what most people have in mind 
as renewable, and coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS) is also carbon-free at 
the output level, and again not what most environmental groups think of as 
renewable. It does seem uncontroversial that at least one of nuclear, coal with CCS 
and renewables has to be adopted on a very large scale for a sustainable future, and 
I will argue below that either nuclear or coal with CCS must be in the mix as well as 
many types of renewables, at least for the foreseeable future.    4 
Renewables come in many different flavors: they certainly include but may 
not be limited to hydro, solar (photovoltaic and thermal), wind, geothermal, tidal, 
biofuels, and waste-to-energy processes. I will focus mainly on those that can be 
used to generate electricity, or to replace it. Most of them have certain economic 
characteristics in common – large fixed costs and low or no variable costs, and 
consequently average costs that are very dependent on output levels. Solar, wind, 
hydro, geothermal, tidal and waste-to-energy all require substantial up-front capital 
expenditures before any energy is generated, but have no fuel costs (all except 
waste-to-energy need no fuel, and waste is usually free). Their only ongoing costs 
are maintenance and operation, plus some energy input in the case of waste-to-
energy. In contrast, fossil fuel power stations have significant fuel costs: a large coal-
fired power station can use 10,000 tons of coal daily, costing between $50 and $100 
per ton, so that fuel costs can be between half a million and a million dollars daily. 
Incidentally, burning one ton of coal will produce between 1.5 and 3.5 tons of CO2, 
depending on the carbon content of the coal, implying that a big coal power station 
produces fifteen to thirty or more thousand tons of CO2 daily. This gives some 
insight into the sensitivity of coal’s competitive position to the price of carbon: a 
price in range of $30 per ton CO2 could double the fuel costs of a coal power station. 
Nuclear is close to renewables in its cost structure: large capital costs and small 
ongoing fuel costs.  
The fact that renewable energy sources are generally capital intensive and 
have no running costs has an interesting implication. If we build a wind (or other 
renewable) power station today, we are providing free electricity to its users for the 
next forty years: if we build a coal-fired power station today, we are meeting the 
capital costs but leaving our successors over its forty year life to meet the large fuel 
costs and the external costs associated with its pollution. When we build a 
renewable power station we are effectively pre-paying for the next forty years of 
electricity from it. This has implications for what kind of financing might be 
appropriate – in particular it makes long-term debt financing seem fair.    5 
There are two questions that policy-makers need answered: is renewable 
energy more expensive than fossil energy, and can it be made available on a large 
enough scale to replace much of our fossil fuels use? Neither is easy to answer.  
You can see one difficulty in assessing the cost of renewable energy – the 
average cost depends on the scale, and can vary greatly, and the marginal cost is 
very low. Presumably we want to compare average costs, and for this we need a 
sense of scale. The usual cost measure in this business is the levelized cost of 
electricity, lcoe. This is defined as the constant price at which electricity would have 
to be sold for the production facility to break even over its lifetime, assuming that it 
operates at full capacity. This is usually presented in terms of private costs, but from 
a policy perspective we need the lscoe, the levelized social cost of electricity, with 
external costs included. We clearly have reasons to think that the external costs of 
renewables are less than those of fossil fuels, particularly with respect to emissions 
of greenhouse gases, but data on this is rather thin.  
What for example is the social cost of using a fossil fuel? In any comparison of 
the costs of renewable and fossil sources of electricity, this is a key fact. Obviously 
an important component of the external costs of fossil fuels is the social cost of the 
greenhouse gases emitted. Here we have a vast range of estimates: we can look at 
prices on the European Union’s Emission Trading Market, which have varied 
between $13 and $25 a ton of CO2 over the last year and a half. But the EU system 
has many idiosyncrasies and it is not clear that this should be a definitive estimate 
of a social cost. Ideally we want a forward-looking estimate, an estimate of the social 
cost of a ton of CO2 emitted today over the course of its residence in the 
atmosphere, which could be as long as the next century. Analyses of the costs of 
climate change such as the Stern Review (Stern 2006) or William Nordhaus’s 
reports based on his DICE model (Nordhaus 2009) provide estimates of the social 
costs of CO2 emissions, though there is little agreement here. Nordhaus has an 
estimate of the social cost of CO2 emissions that is about $8 per ton: Stern’s estimate 
is an order of magnitude greater at $85. There are many reasons for the difference 
but a main one is that Nordhaus uses a pure rate of time preference (utility discount   6 
rate) of 4% while Stern uses 0.1%: over periods of a century or more this is a 
massive difference. Stern also has a more comprehensive and up-to-date estimate of 
the costs of climate change, and allows for uncertainty and a wide range of possible 
outcomes along a business as usual scenario. But the bulk of the difference is in the 
discount rates (see Hope and Newberry 2007). As I have said elsewhere (Heal 
2009), I see Stern as clearly closer to being correct in this debate, and take his 
estimate of the social cost of CO2 as likely to be nearer to a true estimate. But it is 
clear from this review of the estimates out there that we are not going to get an 
unambiguous value for the social cost of using fossil fuel.  
Given this range of values for the social costs of CO2 emission, a recent study 
by Jon Strand (Strand 2008) of the IMF is interesting: it calculates the prices of CO2 
implied by various policy measures to reduce emissions, finding that this is rarely 
less than several times the Stern value of the social cost. Subsidies to biofuels are 
some of the worst offenders.  
The costs of greenhouse gases are not the only external costs of fossil fuel 
use: these include other gaseous emissions such as SO2 and various oxides of 
nitrogen and fine particles, all of which are associated with environmental damage, 
poor health and early death. The costs of these emissions have been studied by 
researchers at Resources for the Future in the context of the social costs of gasoline 
use, and Parry (2001) and Parry and Small (2005) are good sources.  The US EPA 
and the European Commission also report on their web sites studies of the social 
costs of electricity production, with some numbers from the European study being 




They show a very wide range, from almost zero for renewable sources to as 
much as 15 Euro Cents per KWH for lignite coal in Belgium. These figures appear to 
include up to Euro 16 per ton of CO2 emissions, a modest number. Most studies 
cited in the US result in numbers that are very much smaller indeed: for example 
Krupnik and Burtraw (1996) review several studies of the external costs of 
electricity generation, two for the US and one for Europe. Their comparison and 
evaluation is detailed and clear, but also lengthy and necessarily complex and not 
susceptible of easy summary. It does however suggest that the health impacts of the 
introduction of new fossil fuel capacity in power generation in the US are small, 
perhaps because of the high emissions standards enforced on new plants. Because 
there is a cap on total SO2 emissions, for example, it is reasonable to assume that 
any new fossil capacity has zero marginal impact on total SO2 emissions. In this 
sense it is reasonable that the marginal external cost in the US is low, and lower than 
in Europe.    8 
The external costs associated with greenhouse gases are not, however, 
affected by these arguments. As I noted, a ton of coal produces from 1.5 to 3.5 tons 
of CO2, with a social cost that could be almost $300 (using the Stern figure), 
between 3 and 6 times the (private) cost of the coal. If incorporated into the power 
station’s cost base, this is sufficient to raise the lcoe from around 6 cents per 
kilowatt-hour as far as 11 c/kwh. By comparison, the external health costs, at least 
in the US, are under 1 cent per kwh, so from now on I will focus only on the external 
costs associated with climate change. (This is leaving out environmental costs 
associated with producing the fossil fuels, such as the costs of mountaintop removal 
as practiced in parts of the US: such costs are probably not negligible.) And the 
external climate costs of all of the renewables I mentioned earlier, together with 
nuclear, are effectively zero.  
So the external costs of renewables are less than those of fossil fuels by as 
much as 5 c/kwh. What about the private costs of renewables? Is investing in 
renewables an attractive proposition? This depends on four parameters – the costs 
of oil and other fossil fuels (they tend to move together), the cost of carbon 
emissions or equivalently the extent to which external costs are internalized, the 
cost of capital, and the incentives available to producers of green electricity (another 
dimension of the internalization of external costs). Investing in a long-lived 
renewable power station is making a bet on the future values of these parameters – 
indeed investing in any power station is making such a bet. As you must be aware, 
oil prices are volatile – figure 2 shows their movement since oil was traded 
commercially. After a long period of trading down in real terms till the 1970s, they 
now appear to be trending up, though with a great variance. The volatility seems 
natural given that both supply and demand are remarkably inelastic with respect to 
price,3 and demand is sensitive to income. Income fluctuations lead to demand 
changes and a new equilibrium requires a large movement in the price. High oil 
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prices were one of the factors driving investment in renewables in 2007 and 2008, 
and the drop in late 2008 and 2009 was widely cited as a factor contributing to the 
rapid drop in this investment. As Michael Hoel (2008) notes, oil prices are 
exogenous: a transfer of demand to renewables may reduce oil prices.  
Figure 24 
The role of carbon prices is obvious: we have seen how a price on carbon 
emissions can transform the cost of electricity from coal and make renewables 
competitive. The expectation of a price on carbon emissions seems to have 
contributed to a sharp drop in investment in coal-fired power plants in the US in the 
last five years.  
That the cost of capital matters to the economics of renewables is also clear, 
given that the costs of renewables are almost entirely capital costs, and that their 
capital costs per megawatt of capacity are often higher than those of fossil power. 
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the price rose to $147 and then fell as low as $35 before stabilizing temporarily at about $50 and 
then rising again to near $70.    10 
Likewise the importance of fiscal incentives for investment in renewables should 
not surprise an audience of economists.  In this context a striking fact is that 
Germany has the highest market penetration of solar power in the world, but fewer 
hours of sunlight than many other countries: it also offers remarkably generous 
feed-in tariffs for solar power, resulting from a government decision to make 
Germany the leading power in solar equipment production. In the US the on-again 
off-again policies on investment tax credits had a clear impact on investment in 
renewables, as the data in figure 3 show. 5 
 
Figure 2    
Currently three of these four factors are unfavorable to renewables in the US: 
the price of oil and other fossil fuels is low, the price of carbon is zero, and capital is 
scarce. Only the regulatory regime is favorable, and that only since the passage of 
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the stimulus bill, with more positive moves promised for the budget. The carbon 
price is not expected to be zero for long, though there is considerable uncertainly 
about how far congress will move on pricing carbon and this is a major risk factor 
for any potential investor in electric power. A big question is whether the positive 
aspects of the regulatory regime more than offset the uncertainties about the price 
of carbon and the low costs of fossil fuels. On this latter point, it seems reasonable to 
expect that once the current crisis is over and the world economy resumes 
something approximating its previous growth patterns, the price of oil and other 
fossil fuels will jump up again: as noted, demand and supply are insensitive to prices 
and demand is responsive to income, so an upswing in demand due to rising 
incomes may need a big price movement to clear the market.  
Although the regulatory regime in the US is currently favorable to 
renewables, it is complex, unnecessarily and unhelpfully so. To use the production 
tax credits (PTCs) generated, a wind energy producer has to have federal tax 
liabilities. Most start-up companies in the renewable area don’t, so this concession is 
of no value to them. Furthermore, only the owner of the facility can claim these tax 
credits. So what operators have typically done is to bring in an investor who can use 
tax credits, set up the production facility as a limited partnership with both investor 
and managers as partners, giving the investor access to the tax benefits and allowing 
the manager to continue to have a controlling stake in the operation. The massive 
drop in incomes of financial institutions recently has greatly depleted the pool of 
investors interested in tax credits: the bottom line here is that direct subsidies are 
far more valuable in a start-up context than tax credits.  
Many of the most visible renewables have characteristics that limit the extent 
to which they can penetrate the market for electric power. To state the obvious, 
solar produces power if the sun shines and wind produces if the wind blows. 
Neither is true all the time, and neither is fully predictable. This imposes a cost on 
utilities that use renewable power: they need backup capacity for when the sun 
doesn’t shine or the wind doesn’t blow. To date this has not been a major 
disadvantage for renewables, having been more than offset by the premium placed   12 
on green power via the RPS requirements of many states, most of which are not yet 
satisfied. For investors, this is reflected in the low “capacity factors” of wind and 
solar plants, measures of the actual power output as a fraction of the amount that 
could be produced if the plant were to operate at its rated maximum capacity 24/7. 
This is generally in the region of 15 to 30%, a sharp contrast with capacity factors in 
excess of 90% for geothermal or coal plants. This intermittency and the resulting 
low capacity factors limits the markets in which wind and solar can compete, and of 
course raises the lcoe. Electricity markets post-deregulation are complex: in New 
York State, as an example, there are three markets, installed capacity markets, 
spinning reserve markets and spot or dispatch markets. Electricity suppliers face a 
demand that shows strong daily and seasonal peaking, in New York peaking 
seasonally in the summer as a result of air-conditioning demand, and daily in later 
afternoon and early evening when both residential and commercial users are active. 
Base load is the level below which demand never falls, the sales level of which the 
grid can always be confident. This power is supplied on long-term contracts at 
relatively low prices, and comes largely from big coal, nuclear and hydro plants. As 
demand rises above base load levels in the morning, more plants are brought online, 
some coal, diesel, and renewable. The grid managers don’t know how much power 
will be needed on any given day, and so are wiling to pay for capacity to be available 
to call on if it is needed, something arranged through the installed capacity market. 
Here the grid operator in effect buys a call option from the power producers.  
In the spinning reserve market, the grid operator pays a power producer to 
start and run a power station, just in case its output is needed (power stations take 
time to start up and close down).  The last aspect of the market is the “spot market,” 
which in the case of New York is a day-ahead auction market. The System Operator 
asks for bids for power at various times of day the following day, and power 
producers bid in response. Intermittent renewables sell in this day-ahead market 
only, as they cannot offer service as base load generators nor commit well ahead of a 
given date to having power available then. The spot or day-ahead markets generally   13 
have the highest prices, which is good for renewables, but are buying for only a part 
of each day.  
If renewables could store power produced when there is no demand for it, 
they could overcome some of the disadvantages of intermittency and sell into more 
markets. Until such storage is possible, there will be a continuing need for coal or 
nuclear as a source of continuous base-load power. Coal can in principle be close to 
carbon-free, so this does not necessarily contradict the goal of massive reductions in 
GHGs. In addition to these markets for electricity or for capacity, in states with an 
RPS there is generally a market in RECs, or renewable energy certificates. 
Compliance with the RPS is ensured through these, which are tradable certificates 
proving that 1kWh of electricity has been generated via a renewable generator. 
Where there is an RPS, electricity distributors are required at the end of a given year 
to own sufficient credits to show that a specified % of their total annual power 
productions is from renewable sources. 
One way of thinking about intermittency is to say that there is a social cost 
associated with the use of an intermittent power source: this is the cost of 
constructing capacity to replace it when it is not operating, or alternatively the cost 
of leaving demand unsatisfied at such times. This is not an externality in the classical 
sense, but it emphasizes the fact that there is a system-wide cost linked to the use of 
intermittent power sources.  
Wind is the most widely-used renewable currently, and one of the closest to 
competitive with coal. It faces two difficulties in competing – intermittency and 
location, in that many sites with strong and regular winds are hundreds if not 
thousands of miles from where electric power is needed. So the deployment of wind 
requires investment in grid capacity. The best wind power sites in the US are mainly 
in the center of the country. It is widely stated that wind energy harvested from the 
Great Plains (Texas, Kansas, North Dakota) and domestic offshore sites could 
generate enough electricity to power the entire US, though I have not found a peer-
reviewed source for this and do have sources for the opposite statement (MacKay   14 
2009 p 234, Elliot et al. 1991)6. We will later see statements that solar and 
geothermal power could meet all the US’s energy needs: renewable resources are 
clearly there, if we can harness them at reasonable costs.  
Offshore winds are stronger (power generation goes up with the cube of 
wind speed) and more regular, and offshore power stations can be built much 
nearer to demand centers, so that more power output, reduced transmission costs 
and larger capacity factors can to some degree offset the greater capital costs - 
$4000 per kilowatt for offshore vs. around $2000 onshore. For comparison coal 
capital costs are in the range of $1700 to $1900 per kilowatt, some recent 
construction even costing $2500 per kw, without CCS, up very substantially from 
just a few years ago.7 Lack of environmental objections may also make it possible to 
build wind turbines with larger rotors offshore, and power output is proportional to 
the area swept by the rotor blades, which of course goes up with the square of the 
diameter. So bigger and faster is very much better with wind turbines.  
Where does this discussion leave wind in terms of its ability to compete in 
spot and day-ahead markets? The lcoe for on-shore wind is in the region of 8-10 
cents/kwh:  coal with no charge for carbon emissions is less than 7, but carbon 
pricing will quickly bring this above the cost of wind.8 Natural gas and diesel are 
more expensive than coal, and are also sensitive to carbon prices, though less so 
than coal (less CO2 per unit of energy). There is a lot of debate about the costs of 
nuclear, with the most optimistic estimates in the range of 8-10 cents per kwh. It is 
worth noting that nuclear is notorious for its massive cost over-runs. So onshore 
wind could be competitive in a carbon-constrained environment – at least when the 
wind is blowing! Omitted from this analysis is the cost of transmitting wind-
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generated electricity from wind sites to customers, which could require significant 
investments: a recent study for Texas indicated that the costs of connecting wind 
farms in the panhandle to major cities would be in the range of $1.8 to $2.07 million 
per mile.9  
Solar is another high-profile renewable, and again there is no question about 
the abundance of solar energy striking the Earth, or more specifically the U.S. 
According to the Scientific American, “The energy in sunlight striking the earth for 
40 minutes is equivalent to global energy consumption for a year. The U.S. is lucky 
to be endowed with a vast resource; at least 250,000 square miles of land in the 
Southwest alone are suitable for constructing solar power plants, and that land 
receives more than 4,500 quadrillion British thermal units (Btu) of solar radiation a 
year. Converting only 2.5 percent of that radiation into electricity would match the 
nation’s total energy consumption in 2006.”10 Solar power comes in two varieties, 
photovoltaic (PV) and solar thermal or concentrated solar power (CSP). In solar PV 
light falls on photo-electric panels and generates an electric current, while in CSP 
sunlight is concentrated by mirrors and used to generate steam and drive a turbine 
that generates electricity. Solar PV is the more widely known, with solar panels on 
roofs becoming almost ubiquitous in some parts of the world, yet CSP may actually 
be nearer to large-scale viability. Solar PV is expensive: the lcoe is in the range 25-30 
cents/kwh, and capital costs are about $7000 per kw, although with the current 
federal and state subsidies the lcoe can be as low as 11cents/kwh in California. 
Costs have been falling fast for decades and there is a general expectation that solar 
PV will match coal as a power source somewhere in the period 2015 to 2020, 
possibly earlier if a significant carbon price is introduced.  
Solar thermal or CSP appears to be more competitive: some companies are 
claiming to offer power at 11 cents/kwh in the present financial regime, and 
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asserting that costs will fall further. Both forms of solar suffer from the 
intermittency problem, which reduces their potential for replacing fossil fuels. An 
interesting paper from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) studied 
the problems posed by intermittency, and figures 4 and 5 show their estimates of 
the total demand for electricity, solar PV output and residual demand for non-solar 
power on two summer days in Texas and two days in March.11 In the former case, 
figure 4, solar power is available during some of the peak demand period and helps 
flatten the demand for non-solar power.  
 
Figure 4: System Load with and without a large (16GW) PV system on two summer days 
In the case of spring days, when there is no demand for air conditioning, the 
demand remaining net of solar power is less than baseload power capacity. This 
poses a problem: baseload power stations are normally nuclear or large coal, and 
their output cannot be varied easily. The utility would therefore probably rather 
reject the solar power rather than reduce output from baseload stations, meaning 
that solar power cannot be sold even if it is produced. Of course, as its marginal cost 
is zero it would be rational to store it in some way, for example by using it to 
hydrolyze water and then store the resulting hydrogen for use in fuel cells. The 
same is true of wind power. But to date this has not been done. It further reduces 
the economic attractiveness of intermittent power sources.  
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Figure 5: System Load with and without a large (16GW) PV system on two spring days 
Solar thermal not only beats solar PV in cost terms, it also has potential for 
storing power to reduce the intermittency problem. The concentrated solar power 
can be used to heat sodium chloride above its melting point, with the heat from this 
being passed through heat exchangers to turbines. Liquid sodium chloride will keep 
most if its heat for up to seven hours, so that a CSP power station using this 
technology could provide power for at least seven hours after sunset, which would 
certainly cover the evening peak demand period. Implementing this would raise the 
lcoe to about 15 cents/kwh, above coal even with likely prices for carbon emissions, 
but close enough to have a real chance of becoming competitive soon. A solar 
thermal power plant currently being proposed near Sacramento, California, would 
have molten salt storage supplemented by 3,000 acres of adjacent land growing 
eucalypts which could be cut and burned to drive the turbine as an additional 
complement to the solar power, giving the station even more capacity to operate 
outside of bright sunlight. (Growing and then burning wood is carbon-neutral.)  
Although solar PV is not currently cost-competitive for grid connection, it is 
in many distributed applications. Where there is no grid, it is less expensive to 
install a series of small solar PV stations than to build one large coal station and a 
grid. And solar PV can be used at the level of the individual building, as 
demonstrated by California’s drive to install solar panels on millions of rooftops. A 
company called SunEdison pioneered deals with retail store chains in which it leases   18 
the roof space on stores, installs solar panels, and then sells the power to the store 
and its neighbors, and in some cases into the grid. Staples, Whole Foods and 
WalMart have deals with SunEdison. Such deals do not supply electric power to the 
grid but they meet demand that would otherwise have fallen on the grid, and so 
effectively increase the capacity of the existing power stations. 
Like solar, geothermal power sources have in principle the capacity to meet 
all of the power needs of the U.S. According to a recent MIT study, just 2% of the 
geothermal heat located in the continental US at depths between 3km and 10km is 
the equivalent of over 2,500 times the country’s total annual energy use.12 Unlike 
wind and solar, geothermal does not suffer from an intermittency problem, though 
there is a problem of geographical distribution. Geothermal energy comes in a 
variety of flavors, Dry Steam, Flash Steam, Binary, Enhanced Geothermal Systems 
(EGS) and Geoexchange. Key characteristics, common to all, are that they exploit the 
fact that the temperature of the earth increases as we move down, and that the 
temperature below the earth’s surface is constant in the face of seasonal variations. 
Heat can be extracted from the earth by circulating water downwards to warm it up, 
and somewhat paradoxically this same fact can also be used to cool when needed. 
No fuel is needed, except a minor amount of electric power to pump water, so we 
again have a capital-intensive operation. And environmentally it gets high marks – 
no emissions of any sort, though there is some disruption through the siting of the 
plant. The most familiar examples of geothermal energy are those that occur in 
seismically active countries such as Iceland, which derives most of its energy from 
geothermal sources, in fact from hot rocks very near the Earth’s surface. The 
Philippines derives about 20% of its energy from geothermal sources, and in the US 
California takes advantage of its seismic activity to derive 750 MW from geothermal 
sources.  
                                                        
12 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006.   19 
Dry Steam, Flash Steam and Binary geothermal systems require hot porous 
rocks in which water is naturally present and is superheated (raised above its 
boiling point but kept liquid by pressure): they exploit this naturally-occurring 
steam to drive turbines, and are referred to as hydrothermal energy systems. Hot 
porous rocks containing water occur largely in seismically active areas, and all 
commercially operating geothermal power plants use one of these three designs.13 
So these established technologies are restricted to seismically active areas, but EGS 
is not: this is a way of extracting energy from hot underground rocks wherever they 
occur, independently of the availability of reservoirs of superheated water. The 
principle is to drill into hot dry rocks and then by pumping cold water at high 
pressure to fracture them. The fractures form a reservoir in the rocks where water 
is heated, and hot water is extracted from this through another hole. Although 
simple in principle, this has proven challenging in practice, as it requires drilling 
through several miles through hard rocks.14 A recent MIT study suggests that within 
two decades EGS energy could be extracted for 5 – 10 cents/kwh in the US, and that 
by 2050 a total of 100,000 megawatts of electricity could be derived from this 
source, about 10% of the US’s current installed capacity. However, this suggestion 
has to be qualified by the fact that currently there are no EGS power plants 
operating commercially, and some commentators suggest that the extraction of heat 
would cool the rocks enough that over a decade or so they would become unusable 
and the drill holes would need to be moved to a new site.15 In the meantime, 
hydrothermal energy is very competitive and profitable wherever it occurs, costing 
as little as 3.5 cents/kwh. And of course it can provide baseload power as it operates 
24/7, and as mentioned is environmentally benign and so immune to CO2 pricing.  
                                                        
13 For details of these technologies see 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/geothermal/geothermal_basics.html. 
14 see http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/news/archive.cfm/pubDate=%7Bd%20%272006-07-
06%27%7D?printfull  for an illustration of some of the problems encountered in Australia. 
15 MacKay 2008, pers comm. Klaus Lackner   20 
Geoexchange refers to the use of heat pumps to use shallow ground energy to 
heat and cool buildings. The top ten feet of the earth is at a nearly constant 
temperature of between 10 and 16 degrees C (50 and 60 degrees F). In winter, heat 
from the relatively warmer ground goes through the heat exchanger into the house. 
In summer, hot air from the house is pulled through the heat exchanger into the 
relatively cooler ground. Heat removed during the summer can be used as no-cost 
energy to heat water. Such systems are very inexpensive to operate, needing power 
only to pump liquids into the ground and back up. They are more expensive to 
install than conventional HVAC systems, but have a payback period of two to 
seven years, which will almost certainly shorten if carbon emissions are priced. 
This technology is available and in use today, so in principle there is no reason 
why the great majority of buildings should not be heated and cooled in a 
completely carbon-free way and with a zero marginal cost.
16 It is striking how 
little this technology is appreciated.  
There are three renewable technologies associated with water – hydro 
power and wave and tidal energy. Hydropower currently provides about 6% of US 
electrical power, and of course generates no emissions of any sort.
17 It was once 
considered environmentally benign, though today we are more aware of its 
consequences for riverine ecosystems. It is unlikely that more hydropower will be 
built in the US: indeed the trend is in the opposite direction, with some dams being 
removed to protect endangered fish species. Wave power systems seek to use the 
kinetic energy in wave movements to generate electric power: while there is a 
great deal of research on this technology, there are as yet no commercial 
applications, though several are currently being constructed, in northern California 
for PG&E and in Scotland. Indications are that the costs will be substantially 
                                                        
16 This is a technology that does not generate electric power but reduces demand for electricity in 
heating and cooling.  
17 For data on the composition of energy supply in OECD countries see Anderson 2006.    21 
above current market rates, though there is a chance that they will fall with 
experience. Tidal power also seeks to harness moving water, though in a more 
straightforward way: turbines, like small windmills, are placed in tidal flows and 
rotate as water passes over them, generating electricity. Again this is in its 
experimental stage: there is a small tidal power plant operating in New York, in 
the East River between Roosevelt Island and Queens, and some small plants 
operating in the UK. Costs are high but again the expectation is that they will fall.  
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is not a form of clean energy, but a way 
of making dirty energy cleaner. It’s a way of moving to “cleaner coal.” Clean coal, 
of course, is a controversial concept, ardently advocated by the coal industry and 
stigmatized as unreal by environmental groups.
18 The criticisms appear to be 
firstly that it is not yet an operational method, and secondly that even were it to be 
operational, clean coal would remain an oxymoron because of the environmental 
impact of coal production and transportation. There seems some merit in this 
point, but the focus here is on the economics of CCS as a possible route to carbon-
free energy at competitive costs. It’s potential as a competitor for renewable 
energy is so great that any discussion of renewables has to consider CCS too.  
There are several ways of preventing a coal-fired power station from 
emitting CO2. One is to scrub it out of the exhaust gases, using a technology very 
similar to that for scrubbing SO2. Exhaust gases pass up a scrubber tower down 
which falls water with ammonium carbonate in solution. The CO2 reacts with the 
ammonium carbonate to form ammonium bicarbonate, and is removed from the 
exhaust gases. The bicarbonate is then heated, when it turns back to carbonate and 
releases the CO2, which is liquefied and stored in a safe place, generally 
underground.  
                                                        
18 For more details see IPCC 2006.   22 
An alternative is to break the hydrocarbon molecules in coal into carbon, 
hydrogen and oxygen before the coal is burned, remove the carbon, and burn the 
hydrogen. The exhaust gas is water vapor, and the carbon is burned in the oxygen 
to make CO2 where it is easily captured.  
A final option is to remove all nitrogen from the air used to burn the coal, 
so that it is in effect burned in pure oxygen, giving an exhaust stream of pure CO2. 
In this case the CO2 does not have to be separated out and the entire exhaust 
stream is liquefied and stored.  
All of these processes are based on well-understood and widely used 
chemical reactions and pose no technical difficulties. Likewise liquefying and 
storing the CO2 is straightforward. The only complication here is finding 
somewhere to store it where it will remain without leaking out for a very long 
time, the preferred location being an exhausted oil or gas field which held gas 
under pressure for many millions of years and can presumably hold CO2 for a 
similar period of time. In many geological formations the CO2 will actually react 
with rocks to form solid carbonates, immobilizing it in perpetuity. Estimates by 
geologists suggest that decades or even centuries of CO2 emissions could be 
safely stored underground, though not always near the power plants, in which case 
it would have to be transported through a pipeline, adding to the cost.
19 Eventually 
the capacity to store CO2 underground will be exhausted, making it an exhaustible 
resource with a shadow price that should follow a Hotelling-type rule (see Narita 
2009).   
The biggest unknown about CCS not its viability, which seems clear, but its 
cost, which is not. With no commercial scale CCS plants in operation, we have 
only engineering estimates. They suggest a cost in the range of $50–100 per ton of 
                                                        
19 IPCC 2006   23 
CO2 at present,
20 which is too high to be commercially attractive: it would be 
more profitable to pay the likely price of carbon emission permits. However, the 
cost is likely to fall and the price of carbon to rise, so there is a reasonable chance 
of their paths crossing before too long, with costs expected to fall to the range $30-
60 per ton. In such a situation, there is an understandable reluctance to construct a 
power plant with CCS, as this would lock in a technology that might be obsolete 
well within the life of the plant. Retrofitting existing plants is more expensive than 
adding CCS to a new plant, with the added disadvantage that the number of years 
of output over which one can spread the extra cost is smaller, the older the plant. 
Air capture is a variant on CCS: rather than extracting CO2 from the 
exhaust gases of a power station, it is taken directly out of the atmosphere. If CO2 
can be extracted from the atmosphere at reasonable cost, it doesn’t matter where 
this is done, as CO2 mixes globally within a year of its emission. So it would be 
reasonable to extract it where it can be stored, i.e. on top of suitable geological 
formations, avoiding the costs of transporting the gas (see Lackner and Sachs 2005 
for a discussion). Currently only prototype air capture devices are in operation, 
removing CO2 from the air at a cost of about $200 per ton, but there are hopes that 
technological improvements and large-scale manufacturing of the devices will 
bring costs to the range of $50-100 per ton CO2.  
Biofuels are not envisaged as a source of electric power but as replacements 
for gasoline, diesel fuel and jet fuel. To date American experience with biofuels 
has been unfortunate: corn-based ethanol has been seen more as an excuse for 
agricultural subsidies than as a power source (see Hahn and Cecot 2008). But in 
Brazil ethanol from sugar, not corn, provides almost half of all gasoline 
                                                        
20 According to estimates from McKinseys, the IPCC and the IEA.   24 
consumed.
21 Sugar is a more efficient feedstock and sugar-based ethanol is 
competitive with gasoline at oil prices of $50-60 per barrel and is environmentally 
safe, in the sense of having a zero carbon footprint over its lifecyle and producing 
no other pollutants. Both India and China are developing bioethanol programs 
based on sugar. Land availability does not appear to be an issue: Brazil, for 
example, produces enough bioethanol to meet half its gasoline needs from 1% of 
its arable land, and uses land in the south east of the country, far from the 
Amazon, whose climate is unsuitable for sugar.  
Biodiesel is produced from vegetable oils by a relatively simple process, 
and is a perfect substitute for conventional diesel as far as a diesel engine is 
concerned. Environmentally it is preferable, being carbon neutral and producing 
fewer other emissions than conventional diesel. But growing the crops to produce 
vegetable oils as feedstock requires land, enough to be a constraint. For biodiesel 
to become a major component in vehicle fuels it will be necessary to develop new 
technologies, such as the algal farms now being tested. Certain species of algae 
remove CO2 from the air and produce biomass from which diesel oil can be 
extracted, offering a chance of providing vehicle fuel that can be used in current 
diesel engines and is carbon neutral. Currently this process is far too expensive to 
be commercial, but a lot of venture capital money is going into this field.  
So what is the answer to the earlier question – can renewables provide 
power on a large scale at a reasonable cost? Hydrothermal power is cheap, 
available now and environmentally harmless. It’s profitable at current prices and 
should be used whenever possible, but sadly that’s not very often, as it relies on 
unusual geological structures. Geoexchange can heat and cool buildings in an 
                                                        
21 Bioethanol can be burned in gasoline engines with no mechanical alteration if mixed with gasoline 
and forming less than 10% of the total mix: otherwise the fuel injection system needs to be modified, 
though only in a minor way. Many new cars in Brazil have this modification and can run on any mix 
of gasoline and ethanol.    25 
environmentally-friendly way and is also attractive at current prices: that it is used 
so little seems to reflect the type of market failure which is common in cases of 
investing in energy efficiency.
22 Enhanced geothermal systems might provide 
power on a large scale at competitive costs sometime before 2050, but are far from 
there currently. Wind is competitive, at least when there are strong and regular 
winds near to population centers, and will be more so with a price on CO2. Off-
shore wind could be an attractive development, with higher and more regular 
winds close to population centers. Solar PV is expensive and not competitive 
currently, though there is a widespread expectation that it will be by 2020: 
meanwhile solar thermal is a better bargain, just about competitive (before a price 
on CO2) and offering some storage possibilities to reduce the intermittency 
handicap. Waste to energy can also be competitive where trash disposal fees are 
high, but is always going to be a niche market. So the bottom line is that only 
geothermal, wind and solar thermal can be provided at competitive costs currently, 
with the first being limited by geography and the second and third by their 
inherent intermittency. Solar PV, enhanced geothermal systems and off-shore 
wind may all come, but are not yet here, and engineering forecasts have a tradition 
of being optimistic.  
Going beyond renewables to other forms of carbon-free energy, CCS and 
nuclear are contenders. Nuclear already provides 20% of US electric power, but 
since Three Miles Island and Chernobyl it has been a hard sell politically. (On the 
risks of nuclear power, see Heal and Kunreuther 2009.) It has also proven far more 
expensive than expected, and has been a loss-maker for utilities. Various new 
technologies are now available, but as none are operating commercially it is 
impossible to judge the optimistic cost claims made by their proponents. Certainly 
a price on carbon will tip some demand from coal to nuclear. The economics of 
                                                        
22 This is a topic on which there is a substantial literature – see for example Brown (2001), Hausman 
(1979), Jaffe Newell and Stavins (1999) and Levine et al (1995).    26 
CCS are enigmatic: with only one commercial plant in operation, and that on a 
very small scale, it is hard to judge the cost forecasts available. However it seems 
likely that within twenty years CCS will be competitive with the cost of emitting 
CO2. Air capture of CO2 is an intriguing possibility, as it could manage the 
emissions from non-point sources as well as those from concentrated sources. It 
could allow us to continue using fossil fuels, but to the extent that we continued 
with oil we would not solve the problems of high oil prices and energy security 
that are driving interest in non-fossil sources. Air capture at a cost in the range of 
$30 to $50 per ton would change the energy landscape fundamentally.  
An interesting study by MacKay (2009) asks whether the United Kingdom 
could meet its total energy needs from renewable sources, looking strictly from the 
perspective of physical principles and not worrying at all about costs. His 
conclusion is negative: even covering much of the countryside and coastline with 
wind turbines, placing wave energy devices along many hundreds of miles of 
coast and covering most south-facing roofs with solar panels, and exploiting every 
hydro opportunity, there would not be sufficient power to meet current UK needs. 
He suggests three ways of filing the gap: either coal with CCS, or nuclear, or the 
import of renewable energy from solar plants in the Sahara desert by long distance 
direct current high tension lines. The US is better placed to use renewables: solar 
energy alone could in principle meet its energy needs, in the sense of producing a 
number of kilowatt hours over a year equal to present annual energy consumption. 
It would take an area of about 140,000 square miles covered with solar collectors 
to do this: for comparison, the area of California is about 160,000 square miles. 
But this statement does not address the intermittency problem. MacKay, in his 
study of the UK, assumes that this is overcome by large-scale application of pump 
storage technologies (using electricity to pump water uphill to an elevated 
reservoir from which it can be used to generate hydro power when the sun is not 
shining). It is not clear that there are sufficient pump storage sites in the US to   27 
make this feasible, leading to the conclusion that renewables would have to be 
supplemented by fossil fuels or nuclear to overcome the intermittency issue.  
We began with the US DoE’s aim of obtaining 25% of our electricity from 
renewables by 2025. What would this cost? I’ll try to answer an easier question: 
suppose electricity consumption stays constant from now to 2025 (actually it will 
grow, quite a lot if we move to electric cars), what would it cost to replace 25% of 
our generating capacity by renewables? Here’s a rough calculation. Installed 
electric capacity is one million megawatts, or one thousand gigawatts, or a 
terawatt. Wind capacity costs about $2000 per kilowatt to install, leaving out costs 
of connection to the grid. One terawatt is 10
9 kilowatts, so the investment required 




3 is the cost of 
replacing all capacity by wind, we multiply by 0.25 as we are replacing 25% and 
divide by the capacity factor of wind, which I am taking to be 25%. The answer is 
two trillion dollars, almost certainly an underestimate as we are leaving out the 
cost of grid connections and using the capital cost of onshore wind: both offshore 
wind and solar are more expensive. This is about 15% of current GDP, and over 
15 years it is roughly 1% of current GDP annually. In addition to being an 
underestimate, it does not address our dependence on foreign oil for transportation 
or furnaces. It would reduce fossil-generated electricity from about 70% to about 
45% of the total.
23 How much CO2 would this save? The answer depends on what 
the wind power displaces: if nuclear or hydro, then there is no saving of CO2, but 
if it displaces coal, then the saving is about one billion tons of CO2 annually,
24 
                                                        
23 For data on the composition of electric power station fuels see 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/epm_sum.html 
24 Here is the calculation. In 2008 the US used about 109 tons of coal in generating electricity 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/tablees1a.html ). This produced 50% of its 
electricity (see figure X) so using wind for 25% of electric power and displacing coal would reduce 
coal use by 0.5*109 tons, and at 2 tons CO2 per ton of coal this saves 109 tons of CO2. Note that 2 tons 
CO2/ton coal is a conservative number.    28 
about one seventh of total US emissions (7.28 billion tons in 2007, according to 
the EIA http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/index.html ). Unfortunately wind 
is unlikely to displace only or even largely coal, as because of the intermittency 
issue wind will not be used for base load power, which comes mainly from coal 
and nuclear: it will displace the load-following power stations that use oil and 
natural gas, plus some small coal stations. As oil and gas are cleaner than coal, the 
net savings are less than if only coal was to be displaced. Until we have effective 
storage technologies, substantial reductions in base-load coal emissions of CO2 
can only come from increased use of nuclear or the introduction of CCS.  
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